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We agree with Garrett (2015) that too hasty an application
of a duty to rescue in a wide variety of cases should be
questioned and that the “purported duty to regularly
return incidental findings in genomic and genetic
research” is problematic. But we would argue that the
“regular” return of incidental findings cannot be seen as a
rescue obligation, precisely because such genomic findings
are not random or unpredictable—a prerequisite of the res-
cue paradigm. Once something becomes regular it
becomes, to some extent, anticipatable; a collectivized pro-
active approach is then also more appropriate than a res-
cue response.
The example of a genomic researcher discovering
significant information about a research participant is
interesting not only because it calls into question
whether rescue obligations are engaged but because the
raising of the question itself could be seen as an example
of genetic determinism at play. That is, inappropriate
amounts of predictive powers are attached to genetic
findings. Development of new-generation sequencing
technologies means that genetic or genomic research
(and indeed clinical practice) has shifted from “fishing”
for specific genes to “trawling” through the entire
genetic code. Because this can reveal so much more
information about a person than could be gleaned by
the previous techniques, researchers are more likely to
stumble upon something about which their research par-
ticipant is completely unaware. As Garrett highlights,
many have argued that genomic researchers are then
obligated to “rescue” their research participants (Brede-
noord et al. 2011; Ulrich 2013), but the regularity with
which such situations arise depends on how determin-
istic genomic information is thought to be. The chances
of finding a strongly predictive finding in genomic
research that (a) is a reproducible result, (b) is not
already known about by the participant through signs,
symptoms, or a family history, and (c) has an associated
intervention that would prevent a harm from arising,
are much smaller than the phrase “regular return of inci-
dental findings” would suggest.
If researchers are the trawlers, then rescue of those
in danger is appropriate if their trawling net catches
something dangerous and unpredictable, perhaps an
unexploded bomb or a fish that is known to be
extremely poisonous. However, although early trawlers
may have worried about what unexpected things their
catch would yield that day, today they can anticipate
most types of catches, and—to mix analogies—ensure
that children near water always have buoyancy aids or
qualified lifeguards nearby. Notwithstanding difficulties
in defining exactly what is meant by incidental findings
in genomic research (that is, if you are researching a
whole genome, then no finding can be said to be truly
incidental; Shkedi-Rafid et al. 2014), we and others
(Shkedi-Rafid et al. 2014; Weiner 2014) have previously
argued that such findings should not be treated as if
their occurrence is random and unpredictable; rather,
they should be anticipated and their management
should be planned in advance. This strategy fits with
those outlined by Garrett in the collectivized approach,
but would be applied in situations that could not be
classed as true rescue ones.
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LIKELIHOOD THAT GENOMIC TESTINGWILL FIND
SOMETHING TO RESCUE
Making an assumption that the genomic researcher will
find clear and certain information is problematic because
not only will cases of the genomic “drowning child” be
rare, but at present—and for the foreseeable future—the
vast amount of data from whole genome studies will have
unknown or uncertain implications for individual partici-
pants. Variable expressivity (type or severity of symptoms)
and variable penetrance (chance that a person with this
finding will ever show signs or symptoms from it) mean
that it may not be at all clear what sort of rescue, if any,
could be made. Other findings will appear possibly patho-
genic, but the evidence for pathogenicity will not be con-
vincing enough. The routinization of comparative
microarray technologies has shown that deletions or dupli-
cations of parts of the genetic code are relatively common
and often have no apparent health consequences, although
early laboratory reports might have labeled such findings
as “likely pathogenic” (Lucassen and Houlston 2014).
Determining whether findings are clinically significant or
not may depend on a clinical interaction (clinical examina-
tion, family history analysis, radiology investigations)
(Crawford et al. 2013) that cannot be carried out by a
researcher and that would, in any case, mean that a collec-
tivized approach between researcher and clinician is
required before the need for any rescue can be determined.
Our point here is that those who argue genomic research-
ers have a duty to regularly return incidental findings may
themselves have fallen into a genetic determinism trap.
WHO IS BEING RESCUED ANDWHEN?
Garrett’s argument for a focus on justice and social utility
is well made. The genomic context upsets the conventional
rescue paradigm that considers “just two individuals, the
rescuer and the endangered” anyway, because any signifi-
cant risk may also be shared by the participant’s family
members. Hence, any duty to rescue may also then be a
duty to that person’s relatives. By rescuing the one drown-
ing child you stumble upon, you are also committed to res-
cuing other children who may be at risk.
Consideration is needed of not just to whom the obli-
gation might be owed, but also when. For example, if the
research participant is a child, one might argue that a
BRCA1 finding (indicating a high risk of breast and/or
ovarian cancer in adulthood, but an effectively zero risk in
childhood) is not a rescue situation, because there exists no
immediate harm-avoiding benefit for the child (i.e., ame-
liorative treatments or screening). Should action then be
deferred to some future time when interventions are avail-
able (Shkedi-Rafid et al. 2014)? Others have argued that
even if there is no immediate action option for the partici-
pant (or patient), disclosure might still be appropriate
because the child’s mother might be at risk and she might
therefore need rescuing (Lucassen, et al. 2014). If this is the
case, then might an obligation to act also be engaged by
findings that reveal someone is a carrier of a condition—
not because they will likely develop any features of it
themselves, but because they might have an increased
chance of having children with the condition? These are all
important questions that highlight how extremely unlikely
the encapsulated individual rescuer/individual endan-
gered scenario is in genomics.
SHOULD GENOMIC RESEARCHERS EVER BE
THE RESCUER?
If a child is truly drowning in an isolated spot with no one
else around, then a rescue obligation does kick in. How-
ever, if the rescuer leaps in too quickly—tries to rescue a
child who is not drowning and whose mother is better
positioned to do so—then a rescue could be inappropriate
and have unfortunate consequences. We therefore concur
with Garrett that if research participants are to be told
about certain research findings because the findings carry
health implications, then this should be managed by those
in the best position to facilitate the next steps. Rescue
incurred by genomics will necessitate medical interven-
tions, surveillance, or perhaps chemoprevention, all tools
that in any case are not at the researcher’s disposal.
It is worth noting, however, that in the genomic setting,
the researcher–clinician boundary is not always distinct.
Some researchers are also clinicians and some test pro-
viders will have a dual role as a clinician and researcher—
for example, when participation in research is offered to a
patient to obtain a test not presently available through the
health service (Hallowell et al. 2009).
CONCLUSION
Our aim in this commentary has been to illustrate the com-
plexity involved with considering obligations to rescue in
the genomic context. While a genome may indeed reveal
predictions about health or disease that are completely
unexpected for the research participant, the chance of a
prediction that is so accurate and from which a person can
truly be rescued is extremely small. Most highly predictive
genomic alterations will have already given some hint of
their presence, either in signs or symptoms or in a family
history of their features.
When the very rare rescuable situation does occur, we
contend that this should be done by those most qualified
to do so—health professionals—alerted appropriately by
the researcher with careful attention to optimal timing of
rescue and as to whether there are any other drowning
children in the pool at the same time.
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The Preference Toward Identiﬁed
Victims and Rescue Duties
Tomasz _Zuradzki, Jagiellonian University
Jeremy R. Garrett claims that the nature and scope of our
rescue duties cannot be properly understood and
addressed without reference to social context or institu-
tional background conditions. In my comment I focus not
on social or institutional but on psychological background
conditions that are also necessary for the conceptualization
of rescue cases. These additional conditions are of crucial
importance since an entire paradigm of “rescue medicine”
is founded, as Garret notices, on the powerful and immedi-
ate “impulse to rescue” (Garrett 2015). I understand this
“impulse” as the preference toward identified victims, and
I argue that it may sometimes distort genuine moral judg-
ments in rescue cases.
It is empirically verified that people do not value lives
consistently, prefer to rescue identified individuals rather
than statistical (Jenni and Loewenstein 1997), and believe
that they should prefer them because of moral reasons.
The phenomena were confirmed in idealized situations in
which there were no personalizing information details
about victims like name, gender, or age (Small and Loe-
wenstein 2003). Therefore, “the identifiability of the victim
per se” could be isolated as an independent factor that
influences some rescue decisions. This means that the dif-
ferent reactions to statistical and identified victims do not
come down to the amount of information an agent has
about victims or to any special relation between an agent
and victims (some authors disagree with this last condi-
tion; Sheehan 2007).
The most accurate definition of a statistical individual
appeals to a “counterfactually open process.” This is a pro-
cess in which “there is no fact of the matter about what its
outcome would have been if we had not initiated it” (Hare
2012). For example, let us assume that an agent helps some
statistical persons by distributing vaccines against a fatal
disease that attacks some population. It means that there is
no fact of the matter about what would have happened if
vaccines had not been distributed. Admittedly, there is a
very high probability that some proportion of the popula-
tion would have died prematurely, but there is no identi-
fied healthy vaccinated person who would have died for
sure. Roughly speaking, rescuing a statistical person we
cannot expect that there will be a particular person saved
by our action who, for example, could thank us for saving
her life.
This pure preference toward identified victims is an
important factor (although not the only one) in explaining
why people are relatively strongly motivated to rescue
children drowning in ponds in hypothetical situations dis-
cussed by philosophers, but relatively weakly motivated
to send money to charities. In medical contexts this
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